The U.S. constitution makes it hard to
get things done. When a bill is being
considered as a possible law, this is a
good thing because it means that a law
needs to receive careful consideration
and make it through several steps
before it becomes enacted. However,
with government appropriations this isn’t
always the best system.
Suppose one group supports program X and
another group opposes X. You would think
there should be a vote and the majority
would determine whether X is funded or
not. Suppose policy Y is a basic function
of government that everyone supports.
The problem happens if both sides decide
they will not support Y unless they get
their way on X. Suppose X and Y are combined
into one package, and both groups need
to support the package in order for it to
pass. If both groups withhold support
from the package unless they get
their way on X, then basic function Y
gets shut down.
Both sides deserve blame for such a shutdown,
but the real problem is the flaw in the
system that requires both sides to reach
a compromise but then punishes the side
that compromises the most (since that
means the other side gets its way).
There needs to be a system that forces
a compromise to be adopted even when
each side adamently refuses to compromise.
A better system would have these elements:
- Force separate votes on X and Y
so anyone that votes against Y would have
to make the case that they really do want
to shut down Y. - Use median voting in each house so
legislators can keep their promises to
always vote for more funding or less funding
(whichever they promised during their
campaign) but the final amount becomes
the median so neither side can prevent
any appropriation form being made (see
https://douglasadowning.wordpress.com/2017/04/28/how-not-to-shut-down-the-federal-government/
for more on median voting. - If necessary include a round of
joint median voting to reconcile differences
between the house and the senate - Let the president adjust amounts up
or down, subject to an override vote that
requires a large supermajority to override
a small adjustment and a small supermajority
to override a large adjustment. The problem
with the presidential veto as it works now
for appropriations is that the president
lacks the power to make reasonable adjustments
to spending amounts but does have the power
to threaten shutdowns.
When we try to decide what the rules should
be, it is important to consider abstract
situations so you can determine what rules
are best in general and not the rules that
would help the side you favor at the particular
moment.
……………..
–Douglas Downing
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